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INTRODUCTION 
Elianer Dimache and an accomplice entered the First Palmetto Bank 
in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, just after 5:00 PM on May 4, 2008.1 
Dimache approached a bank teller and asked for change.2 While the teller 
was getting the change, Dimache jumped over the counter, pulled out a 
gun, and said, “You know the drill.”3 After directing the bank teller to 
place money in a bag held by his accomplice, Dimache pointed his gun at 
two other tellers and ordered them to remain on the floor in silence.4 
Instructing the bank tellers to count to 100 before moving, the pair left the 
bank with almost $2,000.5 
Twelve years earlier, in New York City, Michael Anglin forced his 
way into the City College Branch of the Chemical Bank minutes before it 
opened.6 After brandishing a gun, Anglin demanded that the tellers lie 
immobile on the floor and instructed them to not look at him.7 Anglin’s 
accomplice then entered the bank, and the two eventually left the premises 
with $610,000.8 
Although these crimes have similar fact patterns, federal courts 
across varying circuits have regarded the defendants’ actions during the 
course of the bank robberies differently. In July 2010, Dimache pled guilty 
to armed robbery per a plea agreement.9 During sentencing deliberations, 
Dimache’s sentence was set to between seventy-eight and ninety-seven 
months in prison.10 To determine sentence length, the trial court used the 
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (USSC 
Guidelines Manual).11 Dimanche’s sentence included three enhancements 
on top of the armed robbery base offense,12 including the application of “a 
 
 1. United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 157 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 604. 
 10. Id. at 605. 
 11. Id. The United States Sentencing Commission has the duty to distribute the United States 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual to all federal courts in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 994. 
The USSC Guidelines Manual is to be used by federal courts to determine “the sentence to be imposed 
in a criminal case,” including the decision to impose a fine, probation, or term of imprisonment. 
28 U.S.C. § 994. 
 12. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605 (“Three enhancements . . . were applied by the probation officer 
to Dimache’s base offense level. First, the base offense level was increased two levels because the 
property of a post office or financial institution was taken . . . . Second, a five-level enhancement was 
applied because a firearm was brandished or possessed . . . . Third, a two-level enhancement was 
applied because the bank tellers were physically restrained to facilitate commission of, or escape from, 
the bank robbery . . . .”).  
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two-level enhancement . . . because the bank tellers were physically 
restrained to facilitate commission of, or escape from, the bank robbery.”13 
“Physically restrained,” per the definition included in the USSC 
Guidelines Manual, means “the forcible restraint of the victim such as by 
being tied, bound, or locked up.”14 Dimache appealed the physical restraint 
enhancement.15 In United States v. Dimache, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with the lower court’s decision.16 
In United States v. Anglin, on the other hand, the federal government 
indicted Anglin on eight counts—including, but not limited to, conspiracy 
to commit a bank robbery, committing the robbery, and committing the 
robbery with a gun—and he was eventually sentenced to 156 months in 
prison, including the two-level enhancement for physical restraint.17 
Anglin appealed the sentence, arguing, in part, that he had not physically 
restrained the bank tellers but merely ordered the tellers to get down on 
the floor at gunpoint; Anglin argued that such action did not merit the two-
level sentencing enhancement.18 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed.19 The court held that because Anglin’s alleged restraint was not 
physical in the strict sense of the word—like tying up a victim or locking 
a victim in a room—the two-level sentencing enhancement was not 
appropriate.20 Thus, Anglin’s original sentence of 156 months was reduced 
to 140 months.21 
As of January 2020, eleven of the federal circuit courts have weighed 
in on this issue, offering sometimes contradictory holdings on whether 
brandishing a gun during a robbery and ordering bystanders or victims to 
remain immobile is sufficient to apply the two-level sentencing 
enhancement for physical restraint.22 The source of this discord lies in the 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B.1, cmt. 1(L) (2018) [hereinafter U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N]. 
 15. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605–06. 
 16. Id. at 609. 
 17. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 18. Id. at 159. 
 19. Id. at 164. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Anglin v. United States, Nos. 97-CR-292, 99-CV-10265, 2000 WL 964947, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 12, 2000). 
 22. Bernie Pazanowski, Brandishing Gun Not Physical Restraint for Sentencing Purposes, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/brandishing-gun-not-
physical-restraint-for-sentencing-purposes [https://perma.cc/TT9V-AKAJ]. See generally United 
States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 
1232 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Parker, 
241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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USSC Guidelines Manual, which provides only two phrases relating to 
physical restraint: the sentencing enhancement guideline23 and a broad and 
misleading definition of what physical restraint actually means.24 These 
unclear guidelines have forced federal courts to guess when it is proper to 
apply the enhancement, creating an increasing amount of precedent 
interpreting the guideline in varying ways.25 
To reduce sentencing disparities26 and clarify the application of the 
sentencing guide to the physical restraint enhancement for a robbery 
conviction,27 this Comment argues that the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) must amend the USSC Guidelines Manual to 
provide federal courts with a clearer and more concise definition of 
physical restraint. Additionally, although there are many state-level 
sentencing systems throughout the United States,28 this Comment only 
focuses on the federal sentencing guidelines for robbery because of the 
disparate way in which these guidelines are applied from 
circuit to circuit.29 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and creation of the 
USSC Guidelines Manual. Part II surveys the current circuit splits and the 
rationale of the various courts. Finally, Part III argues that the USSC 
should amend the USSC Guidelines to provide courts with a  
clearer definition of physical restraint, limiting it to only include physical 
acts of restraint. 
I. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES 
A. Creation of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines 
Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) was passed, 
creating the USSC, Congress delegated to the judiciary almost all 
 
 23. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 
 24. Id. at § 1B.1, cmt. 1(L). 
 25. See Pazanowski, supra note 22. 
 26. See generally Ryan W. Scott, The Effects of Booker on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 22 
FED. SENT’G REP. 104 (2009) (describing how inter-judge sentencing disparities remains even after 
the 2005 Booker decision). 
 27. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 874. 
 28. For a discussion of different state sentencing guideline configurations, see Kelly Lyn 
Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of Variety, FED. PROB. J., Sept. 2017, at 29. 
 29. Pazanowski, supra note 22. See generally United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49 (3d Cir. 2020); 
United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 
2017); United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 
718 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace, 
461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Drew, 200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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discretion to determine the duration of criminal sentences.30 During this 
pre-SRA period, the judicial system adopted the rehabilitation model to 
guide sentencing decisions.31 The rehabilitation model is based on the 
premise that the judge would set the maximum prison sentence; then a 
parole board would reevaluate the prisoner periodically to determine if the 
prisoner had been “rehabilitated” and thus, was ready for release.32 Based 
upon this sentencing system, there were large sentencing disparities 
between circuits, prisoners, and judges, in addition to general confusion 
about how much prison time a specific prisoner should serve.33 Thus, 
Congress passed the SRA in 1984 to alleviate the sentencing disparities 
and uncertainties that were associated with sentencing in federal courts.34 
The USSC was formed to “rectify the ‘rulelessness’ of sentencing 
law.”35 The purpose of the USSC was to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities for defendants that have similar records and have been found 
guilty of similar crimes while still taking into account flexibility for 
mitigating or aggravating factors.36 
Additionally, the SRA delegated the broad authority to review and 
justify the federal sentencing process to the USSC.37 Therefore, in 1987, 
the USSC created “a detailed set of guidelines and policy statements that 
included a sentencing table.”38 The sentencing guidelines, now referred to 
as the USSC Guidelines Manual, categorized “offense behavior and 
offender characteristics.”39 Those categories then correspond to “ranges, 
[given in month increments, that] specify an appropriate sentence for each 
class of convicted persons.”40 In short, the SRA required federal courts to 
choose a sentence from the USSC Guidelines Manual’s range during 
sentencing.41 Use of the USSC Guidelines Manual was mandatory42 until 
 
 30. Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing 
System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 186 (1993). 
 31. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 38–39. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Russell D. Covey, Essay, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 447, 454 (2016). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). 
 37. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 1A.2. 
 38. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 4 (2015) [hereinafter FEDERAL 
SENTENCING: THE BASICS]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). 
 39. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 1A.2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994–95. 
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2005, when the United States Supreme Court held that courts should 
consider factors other than those outlined in the manual.43 
B. How Courts Calculate a Criminal Sentence Using the USSC 
Guidelines Manual 
The first step in calculating criminal sentences using the USSC 
Guidelines Manual is to determine the base offense.44 Each base offense 
has a corresponding “base offense level.”45 The base levels range from one 
to forty-three, the latter typically corresponding to a life sentence.46 For 
example, the base level for first-degree murder is forty-three,47 whereas 
the base level for trespass is four.48 When general robbery is the base 
offense, the base level is twenty.49 
After a federal probation officer determines the base offense and base 
offense level,50 it is decided whether any “specific offense characteristics” 
apply to the commission of the crime.51 Such characteristics include 
aggravating and mitigating factors related to a particular offense.52 For 
instance, a “special offense characteristic” for robbery considers whether 
a firearm was discharged or not.53 Thus, if a defendant robbed a 
convenience store and discharged a firearm during the course of the 
robbery, the defendant’s offense level would be raised from the level 
twenty baseline for robbery to twenty-seven due to the special offense 
characteristic of discharging a gun.54 
The offense levels of a defendant correspond to the USSC Guideline 
Manual’s Sentencing Table (Table).55 The Table consists of forty-three 
offense levels, which are listed on the vertical axis and overlap with the 
preceding and succeeding levels within the Table.56 The offense levels 
correspond to the offense level evaluated by the court and bestowed upon 
 
 43. See infra Section I.C; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005); 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 44. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2A; FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra 
note 38, at 15–18. 
 45. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 38, at 15. 
 46. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 5A. 
 47. Id. at § 2A1.1(a). 
 48. Id. at § 2B2.3(a). 
 49. Id. at § 2B3.1(a). 
 50. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 38, at 6. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id. 
 53. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 1B.2; FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, 
supra note 38, at 15. 
 54. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). 
 55. Id. at § 1A.4(h). 
 56. Id. at § 5A. 
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the defendant based on the crime committed.57 In addition to the offense 
level, the court takes into account the criminal history of the defendant, 
which is categorized into points and listed on the horizontal axis of the 
Table.58 Thus, when determining the length of imprisonment that 
corresponds to the defendant’s situation, the court must consider both the 
defendant’s offense level and criminal history.59 
Figure 1: USSC Guidelines Manual’s Sentencing 
Table60 
 
 57. Id. at § 1A.4(h). 
 58. Id. at § 5A. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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According to the Table, the robbery Dimache committed had a base 
offense level of twenty.61 First, his level increased to twenty-two because 
he took property from a financial institution.62 Next, because Dimache 
brandished a weapon, his level rose to twenty-seven.63 Then, the level 
increased to twenty-nine because the bank tellers were physically 
restrained during the robbery.64 Finally, the court reduced Dimache’s base 
level to twenty-six because Dimache accepted responsibility for the 
crimes.65 Therefore, with Dimache’s Category III criminal history, he 
would be sentenced to a prison sentence ranging from seventy-eight to 
ninety-seven months.66 
C. Modern Changes to the Commission and the USSC Guidelines 
Manual 
In the 2005 case United States v. Booker, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down the requirement that federal courts use the USSC 
Guidelines Manual.67 Freddie J. Booker was charged with possession and 
intent to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base.68 Due to Booker’s 
criminal history and the jury’s finding on the quantity of drugs Booker 
possessed, the USSC Guidelines Manual required the lower court judge to 
select a base level offense resulting in a sentence of no less than 210 and 
no more than 262 months in prison.69 
However, there was a post-trial proceeding where the court 
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had possessed 
an additional 566 grams of cocaine.70 With these new findings, the USSC 
Guidelines Manual required that the judge select a sentence from 360 
months to life imprisonment.71 “Thus, instead of the sentence of [twenty-
one] years and [ten] months that the judge could have imposed on the basis 
of the facts proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker received 
a [thirty]-year sentence.”72 
 
 
 61. United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 2011); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra 
note 14, at § 2B3.1(a). 
 62. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(1). 
 63. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). 
 64. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 
 65. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 3E1.1(a). 
 66. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605. 
 67. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 227. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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On appeal from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme 
Court held that “the existing guideline system violated the Constitution by 
permitting judges to find facts that raised the maximum guideline range 
by a preponderance of the evidence (as opposed to juries making such 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt).”73 
Since then, federal courts have been directed to use the Booker  
three-step sentencing process.74 The first step requires courts to calculate 
the sentencing range in accordance with the USSC Guidelines Manual.75 
Next, courts consider the policy statements or commentary in the  
USSC Guidelines manual and determine whether to depart  
from the sentencing range recommendations.76 Finally, the court must 
consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)77 and all of its sentencing factors,78 
 
 73. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 38, at 12. See generally Booker, 543 U.S. 
220. 
 74. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 38, at 12. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Part of the Sentencing Reform Act, dealing with the imposition of a sentence, was codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
 78. The factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include consideration of: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of 
title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such 
guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments 
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into 
amendments issued under section M 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date 
the defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable 
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments 
made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of 
whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing 
Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, 
United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act 
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including the specific circumstances of the case, the defendant’s character, 
and the correlation between the seriousness of the offense and the 
protection of the public with regard to the length of the sentence.79  
The use of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) allows judges to consider the USSC 
Guidelines Manual in conjunction with other sentencing objectives.80 
After applying the Booker analysis, a court can then more appropriately 
decide whether a sentence outside of the USSC Guidelines Manual range  
should be imposed.81 
Since Booker, courts must consider both the USSC Guidelines 
Manual and the Booker process to ensure all factors are considered when 
determining a fair sentence across defendants who have committed similar 
crimes. Even with the Supreme Court’s modification of the federal 
sentencing procedures in Booker, federal courts have continued to heavily 
rely on the USSC Guidelines Manual to determine appropriate sentences 
and impose sentencing enhancements upon defendants.82  
II. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON THE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENT 
Federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to when the 
physical restraint enhancement should be applied in accordance with the 
USSC Guidelines Manual, resulting in vastly different sentences  
for similar crimes.83 According to the USSC Guidelines Manual, a robbery 
sentence should be increased by two levels if a defendant  
physically restrains a victim or victims to facilitate the commission  
of the offense or to facilitate escape.84 Per the USSC Guidelines Manual, 
 
of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by 
the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); 
and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant 
is sentenced. 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 79. Id.; see also Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker’s Promise, 11 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 523 (2006). 
 80. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005). 
 81. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 38, at 12. 
 82. See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stevens, 
580 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 
15, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 83. See Dimache, 665 F.3d at 605; Stevens, 580 F.3d at 720; Miera, 539 F.3d at 1234; Gonzalez, 
183 F.3d at 1327; Wallace, 461 F.3d at 24. 
 84. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 
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“physically restrained” is defined as “the forcible restraint of the victim 
such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”85 
As mentioned above,86 the Table considers both the crime committed 
by the defendant and the defendant’s past criminal history when 
calculating the defendant’s criminal sentence.87 For example, if the 
defendant is a first-time offender, the sentencing results for robbery with 
physical restraint could be anywhere from thirty-three to forty-one 
months.88 Comparatively, the sentencing for a similar defendant who has 
committed a similar crime with the physical restraint enhancement  
could be between forty-one and fifty-one months.89 Therefore, similar 
defendants who have committed similar crimes could receive sentences 
that differ by eight to ten months, depending on the court’s  
interpretation of the USSC Guidelines Manual and the physical restraint 
sentencing guideline.90 
The following section will survey the justifications that the different 
circuit courts have adopted when choosing to apply, or not to apply, the 
physical restraint sentencing enhancement to show how different 
interpretations of physical restraint can lead to disparate sentencing 
outcomes. Some circuit courts interpret physical restraint in a broad sense, 
meaning any sort of verbal command that restricts the victim’s  
ability to move, while others interpret it in a strict or narrow  
sense, meaning physical restraints must be just that—physical.  
The different interpretations of physical restraint in robbery cases by 
various circuit courts solidifies the need for a clearer definition of physical 
restraint in the USSC Guidelines Manual. 
A. Broad Understanding of Physical Restraint 
The First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that 
courts should interpret the physical restraint enhancement more broadly.91 
These circuits tend to focus on the USSC Guidelines Manual’s definition 
of “physically restrained,” which is defined as “the forcible restraint of the 
victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.”92 At first glance, the 
 
 85. Id. at § 1B.1, cmt. 1(L). 
 86. See Section I.B. 
 87. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 1B.1, cmt. 1(L). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stevens, 
580 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 
1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 92. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 14, at § 1B.1, cmt. 1(L). 
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text seems rather specific, but these circuit courts tend to interpret the 
idiom “such as” to indicate “that the illustrations of physical restraint are 
listed by way of example rather than limitation.”93 In addition to this 
general broad interpretation, each circuit court has considered other factors 
and set more specific standards with regard to the physical restraint 
sentencing enhancement.94 The following cases showcase the application 
of the broad interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement. 
In United States v. Wallace, the defendant Wallace entered a small 
gun shop in Providence, Rhode Island, brandishing a gun and instructing 
the store’s owner and his assistant not to move.95 Wallace was then 
charged on four counts, including robbery and brandishing a firearm 
during a crime of violence, and sentenced to 204 months.96 Wallace argued 
on appeal that his sentence was calculated incorrectly, in part because of 
the court’s application of the physical restraint enhancement.97 The First 
Circuit held that although there was no physical contact between the 
defendant, his co-conspirator, and the victims of the armed robbery, the 
victims were nonetheless physically restrained.98 The court’s decision 
stemmed, in part, from the actions of Wallace’s co-conspirator, who 
prevented the victims from leaving the store during the course of the 
robbery by jumping in front of them.99 Additionally, the court emphasized 
that its conclusion that the defendant’s conduct rose to the level of physical 
restraint was influenced by Wallace and his co-conspirator’s close 
proximity to the victims and the intense nature of the robbery.100 
In the case considered earlier,101 Dimache, the Fourth Circuit applied 
the physical restraint sentencing enhancement to an armed bank robbery 
where the defendant pointed the gun at the victim, which “restrict[ed] the 
victim’s movements and ensur[ed] the victim’s compliance with the 
desires of the defendant.”102 The court focused on the fact that the victim’s 
freedom of movement was restrained even though the defendant never 
physically touched the victim.103 Further, the court emphasized that the 
size of the area where the victim was restrained, big or small, does not 
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impact whether the victim was indeed physically restrained by the 
defendant brandishing a gun and ordering the victim not to move.104 
In another case, Donald Lee Stevens pled guilty to armed bank 
robbery and using or brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence after 
robbing a bank in Arkansas.105 Stevens appealed on grounds that the 
district court incorrectly applied the two-level sentencing enhancement for 
physical restraint.106 The Eighth Circuit held that when the defendant made 
“threats of imminent bodily harm for noncompliance with [his] demands” 
with a gun and forced the victims into a bank vault, this act “created no 
alternative to compliance with the implied, yet obvious, demand [for the 
victims] to remain in the vault, . . . even though the victims could have 
easily freed themselves.”107 Thus, the Eighth Circuit’s understanding of 
physical restraint is not limited to tying or binding the victim and 
encompassed circumstances in which the defendant gives the victim no 
alternative but to comply “with his demand to restrain her movement.”108 
In United States v. Miera, defendant Jacob Mark Miera and an 
accomplice entered a bank in West Valley, Utah.109 The duo told everyone 
inside the bank to “put their hands up” and commanded that the occupants 
“don’t move.”110 Miera pled guilty to armed bank robbery.111 He later 
appealed his forty-six-month sentence on grounds that the court had 
incorrectly applied the two-level sentencing enhancement for physical 
restraint.112 The Tenth Circuit concluded that 
[f]or purposes of this enhancement, “[p]hysical restraint is not limited 
to physical touching of the victim. Rather, physical restraint occurs 
whenever a victim is specifically prevented at gunpoint from moving, 
thereby facilitating the crime. Keeping someone from doing 
something is inherent within the concept of restraint.”113 
In addition to keeping the victim from “doing something,”114 the 
Tenth Circuit held that in order for the sentence to include the physical 
restraint enhancement, “something more must be done with the gun to 
physically restrain.”115 Under this definition, “something more” does not 
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include simply brandishing the gun or displaying the gun during  
the course of the crime.116 
More specifically, in Miera, the court relied upon three 
circumstances during the course of the armed robbery to determine that 
the defendant had done “something more” during the commission of the 
crime.117 First, the defendant pointed the gun around the room, which the 
court concluded would likely have the effect of physical restraint even if 
the defendant’s action was done in an aimless fashion.118 Second, when 
the defendant and his co-conspirator entered the bank, they said “don’t 
move” to the bank patrons.119 In the opinion of the court, this command 
coupled with the act of waving the gun around the room was clearly 
“something more” than just brandishing a gun.120 Third, the defendant 
carried out these actions while standing in front of the door to the bank, 
which could be interpreted as a means to prevent any of the bank’s 
customers from trying to escape during the course of the robbery.121 Thus, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded that when all of these events were viewed 
together, “[t]here is no doubt that such conduct involved ‘something more’ 
[than merely holding a gun] and thereby appropriately resulted in a 
physical restraint enhancement.”122 
In United States v. Gonzalez, Francisco Gonzalez and the other 
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute and related charges, including the use of a dangerous weapon in 
the commission of a drug offense, committing the crime in the presence of 
vulnerable victims, and the physical restraint of those victims.123 
Defendant Gonzalez appealed, in part, on grounds that the physical 
restraint enhancement should not have applied because no one was 
physically restrained during the course of the crime.124 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that by holding the victims at gunpoint during the course of a 
home invasion, the defendant’s actions were considered physical restraint, 
regardless of whether the victims were ever physically touched by the 
defendant.125 The court interpreted the USSC Guidelines Manual 
definition of physical restraint as an example of physical restraint “rather 
than [a] limitation.”126 
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The Dimache court generally summarized the broad interpretation of 
physical restraint: “The intended scope of the [physical restraint] 
enhancement is to punish a defendant who deprives a person of his 
physical movement, which can be accomplished by means other than those 
listed in [the Guidelines’ physical restraint definition].”127 From the First, 
Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings, it appears that 
these courts focus on a variety of factors, including whether a gun was 
brandished or whether the assailant told the victims to “not move.”  
For instance, in Miera, the Tenth Circuit concluded that physical restraint 
stemmed from the defendant keeping the victim from doing  
something, like escaping, rather than the defendant physically  
restraining the victim.128 Thus, the broad interpretation of  
physical restraint adopted by these circuit courts encompasses both the 
actions of the defendant and the reaction of the victim rather than solely 
focusing on the defendant’s behavior.129 
B. The Narrow Interpretation of Physical Restraint 
Conversely, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits have held that courts should only use the physical restraint 
enhancement if the restraint is truly physical.130 Under this narrower 
interpretation, the majority of these circuit courts find that the physical 
restraint examples included in the USSC Guidelines Manual—“being tied, 
bound, or locked up”131—are examples that limit the application of the 
physical restraint enhancement to situations where the victim is actually 
physically restrained.132 This reasoning stems from the belief that if the 
USSC considered other acts to be physical restraint, such examples would 
(or should) have been included in the USSC Guidelines Manual.133 
Again, in Anglin, the Second Circuit held that the examples in the 
USSC Guidelines Manual, which states that physical restraint means “the 
forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked 
up,”134 are flexible but act more as suggestions to interpret the USSC 
Guidelines Manual. Additionally, when drafting the physical restraint 
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enhancement, the USSC considered narrower situations.135 Therefore, the 
court held that merely brandishing a gun and instructing people not to 
move does not trigger the physical restraint enhancement.136  
Absent this narrow interpretation of the USSC Guidelines Manual, the 
Second Circuit speculated that “virtually every robbery would be subject 
to the 2-level enhancement for physical restraint unless it took place in 
unoccupied premises.”137 
For example, in United States v. Bell, a defendant challenged the 
physical restraint enhancement to his sentence after he robbed a Metro 
PCS store with a weapon that appeared to be a firearm and throwing a store 
employee to the ground.138 On appeal, the Third Circuit relied on five 
factors cribbed from other circuit court decisions to determine whether to 
apply the physical restraint enhancement in robbery cases.139 First,  
the Bell court held that to apply the physical restraint enhancement there 
must be “something more than a psychological restraint”; the restraint 
must have some physical aspect.140 Second, the defendant must have 
restrained the “victim’s freedom of movement in some manner.”141  
Third, the defendant must have left the victim with no alternative other 
than compliance with their order.142 Fourth, echoing the Fourth and  
Tenth Circuits,143 there must be a durational consideration when applying 
the physical restraint enhancement due to the language included in the 
USSC Guidelines Manual,144 which implies a restraint that is more  
than momentary.145 Lastly, the court concluded that “‘[i]t is the 
perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining the victim in a space or with a 
barrier, actual or threatened, that constitutes the action meriting 
enhancement of the offense level.’”146 
The Bell court neatly summarized these factors: “[A] district court 
should determine if the defendant’s actions involved the use of physical 
force that limited the victim’s freedom of movement, with a sustained 
focus on the victim for some period of time which provided the victim 
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with no alternative but compliance.”147 All of these factors are to be 
balanced by district courts in the Third Circuit when deciding whether to 
apply the enhancement.148 
By comparison, in United States v. Garcia, Jaime Shakur Garcia and 
two other accomplices entered a Texas gun store wearing ski masks and 
carrying guns149 and ordered an employee to get on the floor.150  
Garcia later pled guilty to one count of possessing and discharging a 
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, as well as one count of 
robbery under the Hobbs Act.151 On appeal, Garcia contended that the 
lower court incorrectly applied the physical restraint enhancement.152  
The Fifth Circuit agreed and determined that merely brandishing a gun 
during the course of a robbery was not enough to rise to the level  
of physical restraint153 because “the defendants did not do anything with 
their firearms that [went] beyond what would normally occur during  
an armed robbery.”154 In other words, the defendants’ acts did  
not automatically create a physical restraint situation because the 
defendants must have done something more with the gun to be considered 
to have physically restrained the victims. 
Similarly, in United States v. Herman, the court considered the 
element of coercion when examining physical restraint. While at a friend’s 
house in Hammond, Indiana, a defendant pulled out a revolver, pointed it 
at his friend and friend’s mother, and said, “Look . . . stay seated. I don’t 
want to blow you guys back, but I will if I have to.”155 The defendant then 
commanded the two victims not to move before fleeing from the house.156 
Herman appealed his sentence with specific regard to the application of 
the physical restraint enhancement.157 The Seventh Circuit also supported 
a narrower reading of the USSC Guidelines Manual’s examples of the 
physical restraint enhancement.158 The court’s decision focused, in part, 
on the USSC Guidelines Manual’s omission of psychological coercion 
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from its examples.159 The court used this reasoning to determine that there 
was no need to apply the physical restraint enhancement when the 
defendant pulled out a gun and directed the two individuals not to move, 
even though such coercion could result in the victims feeling that they are 
unable to move.160 
Further, the Herman court noted that in cases where physical restraint 
has been found to have occurred, courts should generally focus on the 
actions of a defendant rather than the reaction of a victim.161 More 
specifically, “the victim’s reaction does not determine whether there is or 
is not physical restraint.”162 In other words, if a defendant waives a gun at 
a victim and directs them not to move, there is still some discretion left to 
the victim to decide whether to ignore or obey the order. Therefore, 
according to the Seventh Circuit in Herman, the victim’s physical response 
to the defendant’s directive is not something that belongs within the scope 
of the physical restraint enhancement.163 
However, the Seventh Circuit did not consider its narrower view of 
the physical restraint enhancement as a limit on a judge’s ability to impose 
an appropriate sentence. Rather, the court conceded that a judge is still free 
to consider psychological coercion—like telling a victim not to  
move while brandishing a gun—“under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as part of 
‘the nature and circumstances of the offense.’”164 Therefore, if a 
defendant’s behavior seems to be “just as bad as a physical restraint,”  
a defendant could still receive a sentence that is just as severe as if they 
had truly physically restrained their victims.165 The Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that this reading of the USSC Guidelines Manual  
gives judges more discretion in how to apply the enhancement and reduces 
the strain of using the physical restraint enhancement when it is not 
appropriate or necessary.166 
In a Ninth Circuit case, a defendant was convicted of conspiracy, 
bank robbery, and firearm offenses after robbing a bank.167 The defendant 
appealed partly to reverse the physical restraint sentencing 
enhancement.168 The court emphasized the need for a “sustained focus on 
the restrained person that lasts long enough for the robber to direct the 
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victim into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere” in order for the 
defendant’s actions to rise to the level of the physical restraint 
enhancement.169 The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Second Circuit’s 
Anglin decision,170 stated that “Congress meant for something more than 
briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding her once to get down 
to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all armed bank robberies 
will presumably involve such acts.”171 Thus, the court held that the 
behavior of pulling the bank teller off the ground by the hair did not rise 
to the level of the physical restraint enhancement.172 
In the D.C. Circuit case, United States v. Drew, a defendant 
threatened his wife with a firearm while commanding that she come out of 
the closet where she were hiding; he then ordered her to leave their 
bedroom and walk down the stairs while holding her at gunpoint.173 The 
defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm while subject to a court 
order and eventually appealed the conviction on grounds that the physical 
restraint sentencing enhancement was incorrectly applied.174 The appellate 
court agreed with the broader interpretation of physical restraint. However, 
the court also found that the examples provided in the USSC Guidelines 
Manual (“the phrase ‘being tied, bound, or locked up’”175) denote that 
physical restraint “requires the defendant either to restrain the victim 
through bodily contact or to confine the victim in some way.”176 More 
plainly, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “the required restraint must, as the 
[USSC Guideline Manual] language plainly recites, be physical.”177 
Therefore, similar to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Anglin,178 the D.C. 
Circuit Court reasoned that Drew’s conduct does not meet the USSC’s 
definition of physical restraint and that whether Drew’s victim felt 
restrained was irrelevant to the analysis.179 
As a result, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits all concluded that, for purposes of the sentencing enhancement, 
the restraint must actually be physical—actions like locking a victim in a 
room or tying up a victim will qualify but simply saying, “Don’t move!” 
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will not.180 And unlike the broad interpretation of the USSC Guidelines 
Manual, the narrow interpretation of these circuit courts focuses on the 
actions of a defendant and does not consider the reaction of a victim with 
regard to physical restraint.181 
III. LIMITATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO ONLY INCLUDE 
ACTS OF TRUE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT 
The United States Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the 
circuit split regarding how to interpret the definition of physical restraint. 
Short of such a ruling, the only other remedy to the confusion would be 
for the United States Sentencing Commission to modify the Guidelines. 
Therefore, this Comment argues that the USSC should amend the  
USSC Guidelines Manual to include a more specific definition,  
namely one that limits physical restraint as it applies to the two-level 
enhancement for robbery to only include restraint conducted by a 
defendant that is purely physical. 
Following the narrower interpretation of physical restraint 
recognized in the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits,182 this Comment proposes that the definition be changed to the 
following: “‘physically restrained’ means the forcible restraint of the 
victim by the direct physical actions of the defendant and does not include 
psychological coercion experienced by the victim. Examples of such acts 
include, but are not limited to, the defendant tying, binding, or locking up 
the victim.” With this crucial change, robbery sentences involving a 
firearm across the nation will become more standardized, supporting the 
purpose and intent of the USSC and the USSC Guidelines Manual. Also, 
the resulting sentences will more accurately reflect the actions of the 
defendant and not the experiences of the victim, which courts can take into 
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A. Intent of the United States Sentencing Commission to Standardize 
Sentencing 
The United States Sentencing Commission’s goal when 
implementing the USSC Guidelines Manual was to standardize the 
process of federal sentencing.183 The circuit split over the physical restraint 
definition deviates from this goal because courts are applying the two-
level enhancement for physical restraint in differing ways for similar 
crimes.184 By clarifying and narrowing the definition of physical restraint, 
courts will have clearer language to base their understanding of when 
physical restraint has occurred; thus, the location of the crime and the 
presiding court will have less of an impact upon the duration of the 
defendant’s sentence. 
Additionally, outside of the USSC’s purpose, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
states that judges should consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”185 While judges have the ability to prevent 
sentencing disparities within their courtrooms or within their circuits, it is 
difficult to work across circuits. This factor supports the contention that 
the physical restraint definition needs to be clarified in order to reduce 
sentencing disparities because it shows that Congress is still concerned 
with non-uniform sentencing, even though federal courts are no longer 
required to exclusively follow the USSC Guidelines Manual when making 
sentencing decisions. 
Further, from the plain language expressed in the current definition 
of physical restraint, it appears that the USSC intended the  
sentencing enhancement to apply only to a defendant’s use of physical 
restraint and not to the reaction or possible psychological impact 
experienced by a victim. 
Similar to the sentiment expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Herman, 
if the USSC had intended for psychological coercion to be considered with 
regards to the physical restraint definition and enhancement, then the 
USSC should made that intent explicit.186 Without any psychological 
coercion language explicitly stated in the USSC Guidelines Manual, courts 
are taking it upon themselves to unnecessarily read between the lines of 
the USSC Guidelines Manual rather than adhering to the plain language. 
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Therefore, by narrowing the USSC Guideline Manual’s definition of 
physical restraint to only true physical actions taken by a defendant against 
a victim during the course of a robbery, courts will have a more explicit 
definition of physical restraint to assist in a consistent application of the 
physical restraint enhancement. 
B. Reflection of the Defendant’s Actions, Not the Reaction of the Victim 
When reading the USSC’s physical restraint definition,187 it is easy 
to see how the text can be interpreted in different ways—a fact evinced by 
the circuit split.188 Even though the definition seeks to focus on physical 
actions, it does not clarify whether the physical restraint must be 
conducted by a defendant or merely experienced by a victim along the 
lines of psychological coercion. However, this Comment argues that a 
victim’s reaction to a defendant’s actions should not be the determination 
of whether the physical restraint enhancement is applied. Instead, the 
enhancement should only be applied if the defendant’s actions truly result 
in the victim being unable to move due to some kind of physical restraint. 
As the Second Circuit pointed out in Anglin,189 this application prevents 
the indiscriminate application of the sentencing enhancement in every 
garden-variety robbery. 
The decision of whether a defendant’s sentence should be increased 
by the physical restraint enhancement should not turn on whether the 
victim of the crime felt as though they were physically restrained. While a 
victim’s experience can be considered by courts to determine a 
defendant’s sentence,190 whether the physical restraint enhancement is 
applied should not turn upon a victim’s interpretation of the situation 
because different victims in similar situations are not guaranteed to act the 
same way. For example, when Dimanche told the bank tellers to get on the 
ground, one teller might have obeyed the command, whereas another 
might have run away.191 The unpredictable nature of victims’ reactions 
increases the possibility of sentencing disparities as a sentence could be 
unnecessarily increased based upon factors that have nothing to do with a 
defendant’s actions. Therefore, when deciding whether to apply the 
physical restraint enhancement, courts should only consider the actions of 
the defendant, not the victim’s reaction. 
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Nonetheless, this point of clarification in the definition of physical 
restraint is not designed to completely limit a judge’s discretion during 
sentencing. Instead, similar to the point made by the Seventh Circuit in 
Herman,192 judges may still take “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense”—like psychological coercion or a victim’s reaction to a 
defendant during the course of a crime—into consideration when making 
their sentencing decision.193 Given the flexible nature of the statutory 
sentencing factors, it seems unnecessary for judges to consider a victim’s 
reaction when applying the physical restraint enhancement. 
The USSC Guidelines Manual’s definition of physical restraint must 
be narrowed to include only truly physical actions taken by a defendant 
and clarified to not include a victim’s reactions. This change will  
support the sentence standardization purpose of the United States  
Sentencing Commission and will reflect a defendant’s actions alone when 
considering sentencing without completely narrowing a court’s discretion 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).194 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the best efforts of the USSC, disparate sentences continue to 
be a problem in the federal courts. This is evident by the current circuit 
split regarding the definition of physical restraint and the applicability of 
the two-level enhancement for physical restraint during the course of a 
robbery. Courts that elect to use a broad interpretation of physical restraint 
view the definition as non-exhaustive and consider all forms of restraint, 
both physical and psychological, to qualify for the two-level enhancement. 
On the other hand, those courts that use a narrow definition consider a 
defendant’s actions as physical restraint only if the actions are purely 
physical and do not take into account the victim’s reaction. 
This discrepancy in the courts has led to different outcomes in similar 
cases. To rectify this problem without the United States Supreme Court’s 
intervention, this Comment argues that the United States Sentencing 
Commission should amend the USSC Guidelines Manual to limit physical 
restraint to only physical conduct carried out by a defendant in an attempt 
to restrain a victim during the course of a robbery. The definition should 
be narrowed to exclude psychological coercion, keeping with the purpose 
and language provided by the United States Sentencing Commission when 
 
 192. See Herman, 930 F.3d at 875. 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 194. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) codified sentencing factors to be considered by federal courts. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the kinds of 
sentences available to the offender, public policy, and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
228 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:205 
drafting the USSC Guidelines Manual. This exclusion to the USSC 
Guidelines Manual could assist courts in making more uniform sentencing 
decisions with regards to physical restraint considerations and reduce 
sentencing inconsistencies across the country. Under this exclusion, 
defendants like Dimache and Anglin, who commit similar crimes but 
receive very different punishments, will be held to the same sentencing 
standards. 
